How did moralizing religions rise, and what have they caused? The authors test the Big Gods theory, which suggests moralizing religions as a predictor of large-scale complex societies. In addition, they propose their hypothesis, which indicates that warfare, animal husbandry, and agricultural productivity have a role in producing moralizing religions. The results show no significant support for the Big Gods hypothesis. However, they support intergroup warfare, particularly military technologies and cavalry, as an important predictor of social complexity and moralizing religions. In addition, pastoralism has a moderate effect as a predictor for the rise of moralizing religions.

How did moralizing religions rise, and what have they caused? The authors test the Big Gods theory, which suggests moralizing religions as a predictor of large-scale complex societies. In addition, they propose their hypothesis, which indicates that warfare, animal husbandry, and agricultural productivity have a role in producing moralizing religions. The results show no significant support for the Big Gods hypothesis. However, they support intergroup warfare, particularly military technologies and cavalry, as an important predictor of social complexity and moralizing religions. In addition, pastoralism has a moderate effect as a predictor for the rise of moralizing religions.

How did moralizing religions rise, and what have they caused? The authors test the Big Gods theory, which suggests moralizing religions as a predictor of large-scale complex societies. In addition, they propose their hypothesis, which indicates that warfare, animal husbandry, and agricultural productivity have a role in producing moralizing religions. The results show no significant support for the Big Gods hypothesis. However, they support intergroup warfare, particularly military technologies and cavalry, as an important predictor of social complexity and moralizing religions. In addition, pastoralism has a moderate effect as a predictor for the rise of moralizing religions.

How did moralizing religions rise, and what have they caused? The authors test the Big Gods theory, which suggests moralizing religions as a predictor of large-scale complex societies. In addition, they propose their hypothesis, which indicates that warfare, animal husbandry, and agricultural productivity have a role in producing moralizing religions. The results show no significant support for the Big Gods hypothesis. However, they support intergroup warfare, particularly military technologies and cavalry, as an important predictor of social complexity and moralizing religions. In addition, pastoralism has a moderate effect as a predictor for the rise of moralizing religions.

This article examines variation in kinship terminology. The authors develop a new typology of kinds of kinship terminologies, and they propose that terminologies will distinguish siblings of the same and opposite gender when there is a cultural emphasis on cross-sex relations. Empirical analysis supports that a prolonged post-partum sex taboo (rather than sibling avoidance) predicts the presence of a primary cross-parallel component in sibling terminology.

This paper examines two measures of cultural complexity: Carneiro’s (1970) scale and codes assembled at the University of Pittsburg. Analysis suggests the two measures are compatible, thus providing evidence for their validity. The authors assess the usefulness of a cultural complexity scale by testing the relationship between descent rules and cultural complexity. Significant associations suggest that cultural complexity is related to social organization and is thereby a useful measure.

This paper examines two measures of cultural complexity: Carneiro’s (1970) scale and codes assembled at the University of Pittsburg. Analysis suggests the two measures are compatible, thus providing evidence for their validity. The authors assess the usefulness of a cultural complexity scale by testing the relationship between descent rules and cultural complexity. Significant associations suggest that cultural complexity is related to social organization and is thereby a useful measure.

This paper examines two measures of cultural complexity: Carneiro’s (1970) scale and codes assembled at the University of Pittsburg. Analysis suggests the two measures are compatible, thus providing evidence for their validity. The authors assess the usefulness of a cultural complexity scale by testing the relationship between descent rules and cultural complexity. Significant associations suggest that cultural complexity is related to social organization and is thereby a useful measure.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.