Using data on 25 ethnolinguistic groups in the Austronesian language family, this study asks: does cooperation in games vary with socio-ecological differences across cultural groups? The authors suggest that cultural groups that cooperate in subsistence, tend to have intergroup conflict and less intragroup conflict, and are less socially stratified are more likely to play cooperative games compared to other groups. While the results support the first three hypotheses, there is insufficient data to support the fourth. The authors conclude that games serve as training ground for group norms and values.

Using data on 25 ethnolinguistic groups in the Austronesian language family, this study asks: does cooperation in games vary with socio-ecological differences across cultural groups? The authors suggest that cultural groups that cooperate in subsistence, tend to have intergroup conflict and less intragroup conflict, and are less socially stratified are more likely to play cooperative games compared to other groups. While the results support the first three hypotheses, there is insufficient data to support the fourth. The authors conclude that games serve as training ground for group norms and values.

Using data on 25 ethnolinguistic groups in the Austronesian language family, this study asks: does cooperation in games vary with socio-ecological differences across cultural groups? The authors suggest that cultural groups that cooperate in subsistence, tend to have intergroup conflict and less intragroup conflict, and are less socially stratified are more likely to play cooperative games compared to other groups. While the results support the first three hypotheses, there is insufficient data to support the fourth. The authors conclude that games serve as training ground for group norms and values.

In an attempt to explain communal conflict, this study investigated how customary institutions (i.e. legislatures, courts, and chiefs) may impact the communal conflict activity of groups in Africa. The authors suggest that customary authorities act as local enforcements to mitigate within-group conflict, therefore a higher number of customary institutions should decrease communal conflict. Using data from 143 politically relevant ethnic groups, the authors showed support for their hypothesis and demonstrated marginal support that more inclusive customary institutions would be associated with less communal conflict.

In an attempt to explain communal conflict, this study investigated how customary institutions (i.e. legislatures, courts, and chiefs) may impact the communal conflict activity of groups in Africa. The authors suggest that customary authorities act as local enforcements to mitigate within-group conflict, therefore a higher number of customary institutions should decrease communal conflict. Using data from 143 politically relevant ethnic groups, the authors showed support for their hypothesis and demonstrated marginal support that more inclusive customary institutions would be associated with less communal conflict.

The authors explore coalitional play fighting (in which teams of at least two play against each other to achieve a goal) across hunter-gatherer societies, with the theory that play of this type may be a mechanism for assessing strength and utility for future defense or warfare. When played against other communities, they propose coalitional play fighting can also serve to gauge strength of potential allies or formidability of potential enemies. In order to test their theories, they predict that, despite the large energy cost and risk of sports associated with coalitional play fighting, these types of games will be widespread in hunter-gatherer societies. In addition, they predict that of those exhibiting coalitional play fighting, many will play against other communities. In support of their hypotheses, they find that 54% of hunter-gatherer societies examined exhibit coalitional play fighting, of which 81% play against other communities.

The authors explore coalitional play fighting (in which teams of at least two play against each other to achieve a goal) across hunter-gatherer societies, with the theory that play of this type may be a mechanism for assessing strength and utility for future defense or warfare. When played against other communities, they propose coalitional play fighting can also serve to gauge strength of potential allies or formidability of potential enemies. In order to test their theories, they predict that, despite the large energy cost and risk of sports associated with coalitional play fighting, these types of games will be widespread in hunter-gatherer societies. In addition, they predict that of those exhibiting coalitional play fighting, many will play against other communities. In support of their hypotheses, they find that 54% of hunter-gatherer societies examined exhibit coalitional play fighting, of which 81% play against other communities.

The authors explore coalitional play fighting (in which teams of at least two play against each other to achieve a goal) across hunter-gatherer societies, with the theory that play of this type may be a mechanism for assessing strength and utility for future defense or warfare. When played against other communities, they propose coalitional play fighting can also serve to gauge strength of potential allies or formidability of potential enemies. In order to test their theories, they predict that, despite the large energy cost and risk of sports associated with coalitional play fighting, these types of games will be widespread in hunter-gatherer societies. In addition, they predict that of those exhibiting coalitional play fighting, many will play against other communities. In support of their hypotheses, they find that 54% of hunter-gatherer societies examined exhibit coalitional play fighting, of which 81% play against other communities.

The authors explore coalitional play fighting (in which teams of at least two play against each other to achieve a goal) across hunter-gatherer societies, with the theory that play of this type may be a mechanism for assessing strength and utility for future defense or warfare. When played against other communities, they propose coalitional play fighting can also serve to gauge strength of potential allies or formidability of potential enemies. In order to test their theories, they predict that, despite the large energy cost and risk of sports associated with coalitional play fighting, these types of games will be widespread in hunter-gatherer societies. In addition, they predict that of those exhibiting coalitional play fighting, many will play against other communities. In support of their hypotheses, they find that 54% of hunter-gatherer societies examined exhibit coalitional play fighting, of which 81% play against other communities.

Why did headhunting- the practice of taking human heads for ritualistic reasons- emerge in many societies? Through phylogenetic comparative analyses of Austronesian societies, the authors find that headhunting developed as a cultural response to frequent inter-tribal conflict and warfare. When warfare declined, the frequency of headhunting did as well.